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REGULATION OP MONOPOLIE S III THE UNITED JTATE3.
I1EANING OP MONOPOLY i A monopoly is aft
exclusive privilege to deal in or co:
:.. t a t - ' I
matf "be defined <~s tlie unified contro
or use of
i.o cli t^ • In i i o s oi'i
2
lation to practical economics, it meana the eoiamand of so
lar^e a per cent oi the co*.imodity as will enaole it to ex-*
ereise vital control over the entire market and concerns
developed stron^ monopolistic tendencies*
i:01T0P0JY AND ITS hllLATIOIT TO oOCIETY : Events
oi tlie p-.st x ew y e *r s nave, c ,Ui.„ jilgl niio oovious x
democr. cy i s as enlightened ...re the people who are its
citizens. The form of ^overnuent in our United States of
i J.iCi J. C it^aiXCj Aiiut- .XX Will, .v.2> \<C^X n.J OJUl^tUUui
and just leadership. It is e^.sy to deal out criticise re-
_
_
.ti s
PTC . ;
those of our representatives who, with a few exceptions, an
striving to £ive us the hest govern .ent they can, and it is
our detriment if, "by unjust and tlaouwhtless faultfinding,, w<
pufclie oilicials nro
t
art trying to serve. The problem of consolid-
monopolistic _ro up pushed asid e all o/batacle s.
The aim of this treatise is to trs.ce
the monopolist!* tendency of business in the
United States and to portray that part which the
i
The choice of much of the material has been
largely su^^ested "by the manner in whisk Roose-velt
and T«*»ft st».rt~d prosecutions a^i*inst unlawful
combi nations.
The average citizen cones into daily
i
less degree with the otw.te and federal authorities
indeed except for the custom house office/[and in-
come tax collector, most citizens have little inte
L facts
community wkiek every mod citizen should know.
Good citizer ~1 i^ is bw.«sed up on ~ clcsr hr.j\vlcdw e o
tli.e>je needs and 01 t-ie lUiictiomn^ o j. t-j^e ^'Overn**
mental a;e::ciej which have "been created to supply
t
tke:a. With each individual toamuni'ty playing
f *JLr sett lejiient of the Trust Problem will "be
easily accompli sktd*
MIL! T JRY DOIIIIT..TJo:. : The ancient
politics, religion, and literature are clearly
distinguished from the Medic al politics, " r e-
li^ion, and literature. There is no cle .r line of
demarcation in the economic history of ancient
and medieval times owinj to the fact th-.t there was
no rapid change in the methods of the various types
of work. T^e uncient methods of farming, fishin^,
mining, or marketing have survived in countries
like China. The growtk of westers ideas in China
has co me about "by the intrusion of alien influence .
The organization of society in ancient
times was mostly military for th< purpose of
protecting life and property and for the increase
of wealth "by wars of conque.t. The purposes of the
wars of conquest verc to obtain slaves, tribute,
land, and commerce. In conclusion one raay say that
the wars of conquests were for economic reasons. -1
Monopolies of a primitive nature existed
in early times. History informs us of tie Egyptian
Eoyal monopolies of brick, syenite, and papyrus,
and of the Phoenican Royal Monopoly of wheat and
1: Le Ressi-gnol;: Monopolies past j.nd Present,, p* 23.
( t
purple. Tke Greeks had a 3t..te Monopoly on lead
nines and on ban^iuc, while the State of Rome
possessed a monopoly of salt.
SOMAN HOITQPOLIEo: The government.* of
^ncient times obtained a large part of their re-
venue from monopolies. Rome became the great
monopolist of the world for she drained all her
conquered regions of their worldly roods. Mono-
polistic tendencies entered foreign co...,.ercc in
the year 146 B.C. The commercial supremacy end
the monopolistic spirit of artnag e caused Cato,
a narrow-minded Roman statesman, to end every
speech in the senate with the words, "Carthage
must be destroyed." Without ..uch trouble Cato
convinced the Roman capitalists, who formed a
majority of the Senate, the need of overwhelming
the Carthaginians who possessed a monopoly of the
world's commerce. Carthage Was destroyed owing
to her monopolistic tendencies in the commerei t.l
world.
T-.e business methods of the merchants
were looked upon with suspicion by the ancient and
middle ares. The merchant a f; * profits were regarded
as stolen property. The practice of buying directly
from the producers for future sule was regarded as
dishonorable. This practice of buying directly from
(
the producer for future 3i..le, or forestalling
was considered monopoly and robbery.
SECRET AJahiTTir^rTo X'OIVI BU3ir533
III Tim UiTITHj gTATgS; Secret arrangements
between railroad companies* and manufacturers
brought about a lowering of raters of transportation.
The result of such a dealing lias been that the large
concerns in various lines of industry have been
able to sell their products at a lower rate and
thus crowd out the weaker competitor who is unable
to receive the same benefit. Prior to tea establish-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1807
this practice was common. Such a practice has had
a powerful influence in the concentration of in-
dustry. The best illustration of the phase was por-
trayed by the Standard Oil Company. This combintion
oUi Jj^o„.cu ..11 other by reccivin unfair freight
rates. The destruction of weak oil combinations
became inevit .ble
.
LP CAT, UITDER3ELLIITQ- ; Loci underselling
is another factor extremely important in promoting
concentration. Its purpose is to drive out the
weaker competitor. The great corporation may under-
sell in a certain co ;mauni ty mainly for the purpose
of driving out the small competitor. The apparent
losses of the corporation in suck a community are
•
"balanced by profits from other districts* The
chief offender j^uch a practise kas "been the
Standard Oil Company which up to the time of its
dissolution kad "been killing off competition v.i th
great success. -1.
PATITT COITTROL : Control of patents
..Ives a monopoly and also favors concentration.
Competitors are driven out unless a result of equal
v- lue is produced. The Wsstingkouss and The General
Electric Companies control many manufacturing bus-
inesses "by the partial protection of monopoly. The
United Shoe Machinery Corporation has a specialized
line of machinery and may compel the users to pur-
chase every thing, in or.er to use a pater, t of theirs.
This corporation has gone so far as to refuse to
sell machinery thrt might be in3talled for the cheap
manuf ac ture of shoes. This co; p^any has driven out
practically all of its competitors.
REBATES : Another practice used
by lar_c corporations i s t© &ive a rebate upon the
li t price of an article provided- th at th e buyer ... .s
purchased exclusively from the corporation. This is
an example of the method employed by The Amrrican
Tobacco Company, tke amount of the buyer's rebute
depended upon tke greatness of his business.
1: Van Hi $ei Concentration and Control- £. 23.

---- present day ,.-^Ic r< .cn-
erally agreed t&at many of the ye practices are
unfair and, tijfirefore, should be prohibited.
The Interstate Commerce law has corrected some
abuse s, especi ally that pertaining to inter .nd
intra state commerce. Rebating "by the rail-
roads has practically ceased because of in-
vesti#*ti one. The tariff is at present being
investigated by a commission. There is no doubt
that some readjustment is needed. Advantages
gained from patents are legal and can only be
altered by a thorough revision of the patent
laws* Rebates by manufacturers on purchases have
been upheld in some cases by ike comity but ex-
clusive rebates are held as contrary to lav/. }!any
people think that the corporation should be re-
quired to ruake their charges in different parts of
the country correspond to the charge & plus trans-
portation. Yet is is an accepted principle of
tri«.de that a larger quantity of joods purchased
should be sold cheaper than in smaller quantities.
ADVANTAGES IN COm 1TATI ON
;
Th er e
are certain economic advantages of concentration
namely
:

A. Tkt method of handling material*
B. Machine use and depart aental
sp e ci all z ati o n
.
G . Labor distinctions.
D. The consecutive sta;;e of mnu-
faeturin: ;
.
E. Consolidation in management of
p lento.
F. Utilization of by-products.
G. Union of allied industries.
H. Use of modern means.
I. ' The experiment station.
J. The chance of extreme ability.
K. Labor wa;;es and protection. -1.
Economy is noted when material is handled on a lar
BCale. In i.n iron foundry the "blast furnace pre-
pare a the v/ay "by "burning out the molten metal each
department performs its proper function until the
finished product is ready for sale.
Labor saving machines in one of the
greatest eauses of economic efficiency. This ay
"be clearly illustrated by the invention of Eli
Whitney. The cotton _;in separated in one day, mo*
seed from the fiber than was possible to be aecomp
lished by sixteen negroes. If an article requires
many processes in its manuf ..cjire, t e concern, if
1: Van Hise: Concentration and Cmtrol & 8-14.

lar^e one, usually has a, separate machine for each
proee.^. Then ..,an specialization for different
kinds of work adds to efficiency for example, tlrie
iron and wood depcrt aent s v/ould "be separate as
would tae painting and varnishing*
In the oluen days a single individual
cOiduienced a partitular line of work and continued
until the product was eo pleted; for e :ample, the
shove maker at his oena* did all the different stages
of v/ork in the making of a pair of shoes -- now
seores of people take part and practically all
manufa*tureres have specialized labor on a &iven
product
.
. 'V..
:
J ' .-j ,i: One of .
•greatest &tep3 in the concentration of industry is
the consecutive ataa;e of manufacturing whereby the
manufacturer produces the raw material and all
sta _es to -the finished product. Both economy and
efficiency result because the different units of the
industry are in harmony, on€?in reference to the
Other. The United States Steel Corporation mines
its raw materials, assembles them, smelts the metal
into pi^s, changes the iron to steel and the steel
into various forms as needed. One of the greatest
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id. da "by such a method is that of labor.
It is possible to make tie same
product in different plants so that one corporation
handles one line of work; thus little shifting or
oh^n^inj of machinery is necessary. Consolidation
of management of plants whi«h make the same classi-
fication of products hut v. rich are, located in
different parts, is eeonomieal because transportation
c}-'.r we^ are lessened and this lone is an i -portent
factor. This factor may be of •ontroiling importance.
Another advantage of magnitude is
the utilization of the by-products; for example, in
the production of meat, aides, fat, and bone become
a very important part of the income. The return of
by-product mat -ri Is in lar,:e industries lessens
greatly the cost of running such a plant. Allied
industries use the by-products of the central
organizations. Hany eoneerns have entered lines of
business which are related to their own.
The fastest labor saving devices
and the best technical devices make for efficiency;
therefore, the up to date company uses only the
modern types. Lack of sufficient capital to put
arts plant into up " to - date condition has frequently
/
--11--
resulted in the failure of the concern with an
i nt.de c;u
:
: t e p 1 an t
.
All the large organizations hart
investigating department s whose main duties it
is to seek still further improvement. Many
c o i:^. unies h r.v e c: go e riement s t :.,tions und 1 ar g
e
sums of mjney are spent seeking greater efficiency.
PURCK^glliG POVifKR: From a business
standpoint the lar&e organizations are able to
buy cheaper for they are able to purchase in lar^e
quantities. In the s^.ie oCii^e because of their
greater out-put from the modernized f . stories they
are able to sell in large quantities and most
advantageously. Central officers distribute to
the different plants the orders taken and they take
into account the coot of trnasjort tion. A, en to
are sent to foreign countries to build up trade.
The losses through bad debts with large combinations
are almost nil. Corporation of independent units
in the regulation of production is one of the
greatest advan tu.es in concentration.
Corpor .-.tions frequently claim that
as the result of their endeavors many advantages
including steady employment, better wages, pro-

lection against industrial accidents and other
"benefits are gained.
The small manufacturer in the
little town, except for patent protected articles,
has either disappeared becc.u.'ie of tlie stress of
competition or else lias "become an unit in a
large organization.
EARLY C0X3ir^TIQH3: One part
of the gre^t industrial revolution in America was
the growth of lar^e mills and factories employing
the most modern machinery and experienced managers.
Various forms of combinations v/ere used in order
to avoid competition and price cutting. This
step known as the pool was another in the >£evelcp-
ment of combinations. This arrangement flourished
between the years 1 377 to I'.'v,'. Thi s w s an
a_ree..;ent among producers to mainatain prices by
allotting to each member a certain percentage of
all the business ts. t was transacted; or in other
cases by tke division of a territory or sharing
tkc profits among members of the organization.
In such ca^cs, price v.oulu he kept ...t a profitable
level
•
COAL POOL: About the year 1872
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tiie anthracite go: 1 producers of Pennsylvania
entered into a pooling agreement. They re-
gulated the total amount of coal to be mined
each year and fixed the amount each competitor
could produce. The producers in this particu-
lar instance were also members of the railroad.
Thus they were able to place freigkt rates at
such a hi.;h level that those not in the pool
v/ere unable to compete with them.
OTIffiK POOLS: In 1031 a success-
ful pool was formed by the distillers of whiskey;
and this was followed by a steel pool which con-
trolled the price and production of steel r . .1 1 s
.
The railroads of the country entered into agree-
ments which would divide the traffic of freight on
a percentage be. si a. This did away with a bitter
rate war among the aompetir.;; carriers. The
Hichifan Salt Association also formed a pool in
1876. Tils organization soon gained control of
eighty-five per cent of the business of the state.
The salt manufacturers of the state became tlae
stockholders and each v/as allowed a percentage of
shares in said association in proportion to wh t

—14—
lie produced. Thus each manuf aeturer 1 s out-
put was fixed by the association as well as
the selling and price of his product. V/ith the
exception of running his ov/n manufactory the
entire management of his business was given by
its owner.
PRUIT CtRQV/ERS 1 EXCHANGE: The
fruit growers' exekanges are very analogous to
the pool of the sale manufactureres especially
as regards a specified locality. The district
exchanges which were first formed have banded
themselves into a national exchange. This makes
it possible for the aro..t c c . \aa:;e ^ to control
eighty to ninety per cent of the entire crop.
Thos^engaged in growin. . a definite fruit or
.
roup of fruits become the stockholders of the
excnan ;;e for a definite period. The exchange
acts as a a ...lea person and charges co.:ai asion
for services rendered. Even though a fruit
grower disposes of aome of his crop without the
...ervices of the agency he is assessed tke com-
mission just as though the company had handled
tke product.
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When the producers be^in ship-
pin:;: their fruit to the market the exchange
immediately fixes a price for a definite
period. This price may "be rai sed after a
certain time limit. Perishable and fruits
that keep well are graded and prices fixed
accordingly. Price fixing is a very important
function of the association; for too kigk a price
will result in the casti:v into public d^.p
much of tiie product after the season of sale.
Careful estimates of crops are m&ae each year.
Experienced fruit handlers and inspectors are
employed by the association who harvest, store,
sort, and pack, as well as ship the fruit. The
growers merely retain their own individual
The association endeavors to yet
their product to the grocer and dealer, thus
eliminating the speculator. Th 3 the ^arketin^
cost is greatly lessened. Products thus assure
a fair return to the producer.
The fruit growers 1 exchanges are
best exemplified by the California Fruit Growers'
•
— 16-
Assoeiation. There is a contract made be-
tween the association and the individual
grower whieh includes the following terms:
1. All .^oods must be sold to
the association.
2. Goods MXM to be packed and
deliver - d witlain five days.
Should the dealer fail to live up to the second
agreement, tne association takes possession of
the growers' orchard. The fruit is then picked,
packed, and marketed at the expense of the
owner. The main purpose of such an association
is really the control of the market on all
citrous fruits.
Otiier sellin a ;enciea endeavor
at times to control. The coal operators whose
market is Chicago attempted to control the out-
put of that commodity. They controlled approx-
imately fouifyptr f«nt of tiie output. These coal
operators were warned by the federal authorities
that such action would be combination in restraint
of trade. -1.
V/EATO^o i OLn POOL a: The non- en-
forcible agreement ^ave the pools a fundamental
1: Van Hise; Concentration and Control. A 66-67.
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weakness. As a method of stabilizing prices,
pools were not altogether satisfactory. A
member that became dissatisfied could v.i th-
draw at any time. The courts refused to en-
force regulations made under pools. Honor
among the individuals was the only hope of
holding to-gether. Harmony among rival in-
dustrial managers was the main dependence.
It was not always easy to find a basis of di-
vision of profits or fix the years business in
advance
.
COUPETIHg C0:JEIITATI0N3: "The
modern trust is the natural outcome of evolution
of social conditions and ethical standards which
are recognized and established among men io4&y
as being neeessary elements in the development
of civilization." -1.
"Trusts are taken to mean manu-
facturing corporations with so great capital and
power that they are at least thought by the public
to have become a menace to their welfare, and to
have temporarily at lev.st, considerable mono-
polistic power." -2.
The earliest trusts were formed by
1: Moody; The Truth About The Trust s^ h. 494.
2: Jenks; Trust Problem. |>. 8.

havin
;
competing corporations place their
stock in the hands of a board of trustees
who v/ere thus enabled to manage the business
of the several corporations in such a manner
as to secure complete harmony of action.
The original stockholders of each corporation
were ~iven trust certificates in exchange for
their stock and they received dividends on
this basi a of ti£ je certificates. The first
ttombin; tion in such a movement was tit* Standard
Oil Company. The trust in /f5 original form
had a very short existence. The courts de-
cided t . t this iu«ti-iod of combination v/as illej
for the judgment was made that corporations had
no power to surrender their control to a board
of trustees.
T RU JT XROBU&L l T lc trust
problem as it is called, means the- wide spread
tendency to do business on a lar<je scale.
Trusts are no.. d unlc i sines* on a large
scale becomes evil. On the contrary when the
trust bo cs about as the result of a free de-
velopment it is a benefit. As a benefit it
•
wo aId "be wrong to attempt to "break it up.
The trust movement has been re-
ferred to as the industrial revolution. It
may also be determined as a purely speculative
movement. The influence of the trust movement
brought about by the accummulati on of capital
has been widespread. Modern machinery has re-
placed man power to an extent never dreamed.
There has beer, a belief that every combination
has in it a potential gold mine.
INDUSTRIAL LIBERTY ; To stop
individual initiative toward combining in an
aggregate and furnishing a vast sura toward carry-
ing on industry v/ould be arresting the v/heels of
progress. The present era is one of specialization,
hence a uniform method of production gains weight.
It is almost impossible to curb the formation of
combinations. One might as well endeavor to stop
the falling of rain or the flowing of the rivers.
The ever growin - trade of the world demands that
business be done where immense capital tends to
lower the cost of production. Industrial liberty
i

. i i turn, abuses which - i^torj' tc uc."..e o .atwe
always cropped out even though restrictions
have betn made.
If all are given equal opport-
unities tke result will "be that business will
flourish and regulate itoelf alon^ legitimate
lines. Tho ae business ..en who eal with the
public, whether lotal, national, or international
soon find out that the su«cess of their en-
deavor^ depends primarily on the code of honor.
Justice to all, whether one is a consumer, an
employer, or a competitor, should he tlx ui of
democracy.. The well being of one depends upon
the well bein^ of all.
SOiiC definite idea may be £iven
in order that this movement of co n solidati on may
he noted.
C0TT30LID ;.TI r-?T : Of tfo lesser
industrial "trusts" there are approximately two
hundred ninety eight trusts with a capitalization
of four and a quart &r billion rs.
number represents a consolidation of over three
thousand four hundred original plants.
•
Of t lie thr e e hundr e d e
i
r-] 1 : e n
ii iport- .nt induutriul trusts, the ar^-re^ute
capitalization at the present time is
approximately seven . nd . half billion dollars.
These trusts represent a eondolid- tion of about
five thousand three hundred distinct plants and
cover practically every line of industry in the
United States. About two- thirds of this number
of active industrial organizations have tome into
existence throuh incorporation since 189 8.
About one third of this -roup have been organized
under the statutes of New Jersey. The year 1898
represents the beginning of the formation of the
modern trust. The total capitalization prior to
that date of the trusts was about a billion
dollars, while those formed since that time have
a capitalization of over six billion.
The control of markets, by indivi-
dual trust differs-..
# Respective industries
ran^e anyways from ten to ninety-five per cent.
3eventy-ei at control fifty per cent or more of
their product; fifty- seven control more than sixty
per cent and twenty- six control eighty per cent
•
or over.
BELL "SYSTEM : Without taking into
consideration the i nense number of loc.l i'r...n-
•hist consolidations (whose capital runs up into
the hunared of millions) the total outstanding
capitalization of the greatest franchise con-
solidations is reported to be "bout four "billion
dollars. The telephone industry i s "by far the
;rc: t st of this .-roup, for although, only con-
sidered locally, its effect is far reaching. The
Bell telephone system is the leading truut in
this industry, yet, extensive, as it is, in al-
most every part of the United States and Canada,
competi ti on is met, for there are at lea:.t two
thousand small independent telephone companies in
the United State s to-day .• The total number of
telephones in operation "by the Bell system is
.;iven as three and three quarter millions. Those
of the independent lines operate in the neighbor-
hood of two million phones.
ESTERN UJTIOIT ; In the same nature
of the telephone group is the telegraph industry.
Two large trusts \ ho operate in complete harmony
•
carry on extensively in this field. Much
the larger of the two is the Western Union.
Its competitor is the Postal Telegraph Cable
Company which is a corporation allirried with
the Jtaekay Bennett cables in this country and
Europe. In addition it holds the controlling
interest in the Pacific Commercial C..ble
Company operating between this country, Hawaii,
and the Philippines.
The total capitalization of the
trusts which embrace the telephone and tele rap*
industries amounts to about seven hundred million
dollars. This amount represents tho s consolid-
ations of one hundred thirty -six original plants.
loc;,l .yr: ryi : :'J: Of the local
franchise consolidations the most important are
the z a > electric li^ht, and trolley systems.
The i:uuense capital of over three billion dollars
is held by one hundred three of these concerns.
The greater ac .re^ .tions of this r;roup is found in
the cities wherein are found the centers of pop-
ulation and include such cities as New York, Chic
a
Boston, and Cleveland.
•
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Iht railway consolidations re
present one thousand and forty original
companies. The capitalization of this group
is over nine million dollars and control of
over ninety per cent of the railway mileage
is in t lie i r hand s
.
group whieh represents industrial, franchise,
and transportation consolidations include
four hundred and forty-five trusts with an
a_ ;re£ate capitalization of twenty and a half
billion dollars and embrace about eight thousand
six hundred and sixty -four original companies.
A further analysis will show:
Thus it may be noted that the
"Of the franchise trusts:
11 exceed 5100,000,000.
£3 exceed 50,000,000.
94 exceed 5,000,000.
Of the industrial:
10 exceed $100,000,000.
30 exceed 50,000,000.
129 exceed 10,000,000.
Of + vhe six ;rr t r -..11road tcu : m :
All exceed ftl , 000 , 000 , 000
.
Horjan roup exceed 200,000,000." -1
1: Moody i The Truth About The Trust, fa. 489.
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flTACTDARD OIL GQMPAHY: Of the
dominating influence of the trust it is well
worth noting that v/i elded "by the Standard Oil
Company or Rockefeller control, either direct
control or that to a marked degree is held
by this magnanimous consolidation. In face the
Standard Oil may well he represented as the
"Father of all Trusts."
In 1665 John D. Rockefeller, in
partnership with Samuel Andrews and Henry M.
Flagler, had gone into the "business of refining
oil in Cleveland. There v/ere already a number
of concerns in this same business. Rockefeller's
company prospered rapidly. Andrews had genius
for finding improved methods of manufacturing not
only oil, but in by-products as well. Rockefeller's
genius consisted in steering the company through
business problems that alwys beset a new company.
A strong cash reserve was carefully accumulated.
Rockefeller gave advice to his partners, as follows:
"Don't "buy new clothes and fast horses; let your
wlfi wear her last year's bonnet. You can't find
any place where money will earn what it does here." -1
1: Bourne and Benton; American History, p. 491
•
lae partners kept tkeir money in the "business.
When business dep:, cyjion came in 1366 and ajain
durin : the panic ol" 1373, the companies wkQ
lacked a c sh reserve found themselves in trouble.
The Boc^feller jroup v/as not only untroubled, due
to their v.st cash reserve, but found themselves
in a position to buy up the plants of the less
fortunate. In 1370 Roelfi'eller, Andrews, and
Flagler invited into thier combination other
capitalists and reorganized as the Standard Oil
Company of Ohio. Within the space of two years
they gained control of all the refineries of
Cleveland and be .an to jcarch for new fields to
conquer. Three years later thirty-one companies
in Pittsburgh a d all the great refineries of
ITew York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore had been
absorbed. The Standard Oil Company not only made
profitable contracts with the railroads but al so
built pipt lines that carried t..e oil to the
refineries. Within a short period of time the
Standard Oil Company manufactured barrels and
whatever the oil business required. In trJ. s v.ay
a giant trust or monopoly was built. The effect
of this giant trust was far reaching. Business
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warfare of such a dejree knew no mercy. By
1379 the standard oil Company produced ninety
per cent of the petroleum of the United States
and at thut tine it meant seventy five per
cent of the world's supply.
Durln the decade 1880-1890,
"business leaders "be^an to devise ascheme through
which they could alto id compe ti tive warfare. In
1882 the standard Oil Trust was formed for the
purpose of bringing competing business under one
management. The Standard Oil Tru.it was a com-
bination of thirty-nine refineries. &nd controlled
from ninety to ninety -five per cent of the
products. In order to avoid conflicts among
the different combinations the affairs of the
trust were placed in the hands of a board of
trustees, with Rockefeller at the head.
The trust problem v/as brought to
the attention of the public due to the mis-
treatment of the small independent producers.
Numerous decisions of the state courts main-
tained that tae trust was an illegal business
practice. Finally in 1890, Congress outlawed
the trust by the passage of the Sherman Anti-

trust Act. The Standard Oil Trust was the
first large combi nation to "be ordered to
dissolve under this act. However, the
Standard Oil Tru-t did not dissolve us it
continued "business under the staie jro up of
.....na^ers, cut with a different name. The
Standard oil Trust ^elected the Standard
Oil Company of 17ew Jersey as a "holding
company" and in 1899 the company was re-
cognized as a New Jersey corporation.
Theoretically, the Standard Oil Trust way
dissolved, but business was carried on int;he
some manner.
The practice of holding companies
was a violation of the State corporation lavs.
New Jersey changed its law in 1899 so as to
allow this form of "business. A corporation
chartered. in New Jersey need not^ .ny businc
in the st-.te except to have an office an carry
on its business affairs. A holding company would
merely have to uold shares of the corporation,
elect officers, receive dividends from allied
companies, and turn them over to their own .^to ck anc*
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bond holders. Several other states followed
the exampls of New Jersey and the "holding
company" became the popular organization of
industrial combinations from 139 7 to 19 04.
There was no mens of curbing a corporation
chartered in one of the states from doing
business in any otlier states and thus the
,tate Anti- trust laws were nil. The trust
and the holding uo mp any were merely agents to
continue illegal business practices. The
Siltrman Anti- trust Act was ineffective for the
trust co n ti nuc d
.
In 1906 the Government brought a
duit against the Standard Oil Company, which
was then recognized as the New Jersey Corpor tion.
The pjfflpoye of fcfcd s suit was to dissolve the oil
company. In 19 if the United States Supreme Court
decided against the to nipany and ordered its dis-
solution. The decision was baaed upon the fact
thc,t this company had developed through unf ir
competition and a monopoly existed because of the
power to limit output and to fix prices. In theory,
tae standard Oil Company is now separated into its

sonsti tuent e dissolution of the
Standard Oil Corporation hus no effect upon
tlie profits of the owners* At the present
time the Standard Oil Company uomin:. te ^ the
oil industry in the United States
•
Recently the Standard Oil
Company has "been reported to "be heavily in-
terested in the production of asbestos.
Different individuals who are* member s of the
Standard oil Company £roup of financiers are
identified with a great many of the prominent
trusts. Their indirect influence is of migkty
important* for it is a well known fact tr t
none of these financiers are found connected with
any of the crippled or mismanaged trusts.
To the franchise a; vre^ations the
influence of the standard Oil Company is far
reaching. The interest of the Rockefeller com-
binations practically dominate all public service
ag ;re
:j tions of greater ITew York where an i me use
capital of seven hundred and twenty-five million
dollar^ is invested. Directly connected with the
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&as companies of NtW York is the United Gas
Improvement Company of Pennsylvania which
dominates in its sphere in this state.
The Standard Oil Company is one
of the conspicious factors in the steam rail-
road field and is const ntly incre^iir: its
influence. According to reports from Wall
Street, within the next decide the Standard Oil
Company will be the sin.--.le dominating force in
the world of railway finance and control.
li.jt: j r : s.. :'.::&£ oil
vy~ The alliances within the railroad
and industrial field ^.re also supplemented by
the banking influence held by this cre &t cor-ipany
in ITew York. The Standard Oil Chain of banking
institutions headed by the great national City
Bank with a capital and surplus of $40,000,000 and
deposits cxeeedin,: 200, 000, 000 includes also the
Hanover Nati onal Bank; tlie Second ETati onal Bank;
t-xe United States Trust Company; the Farmers' Lao
n
and Tru^t Company; the Central Realty and Bond
-Company, and a number of smaller institutions. -1.
1: iioody: The Truth About the Trust. P. 491.

In conjunction with tkeir own
interests some of these institutions have
strong dominating influences with lar^e hank-
ing institutions of other large eities. In
fact an attempt to approximate the influence
of the Company in the industrial, financial,
and commercial interest would be an impo ssibili ty
.
Their ramifications are too varied and extensive
to even endeavor to draw any line of division.
MORGAN" INTERESTS : The Morgan
Oroup of industries and transportation companies
is next in line of importance to the Standard
Oil roup. This is the only trust that ean he
considered on the Same plane as the Standard Oil
Trust. When we speak of these trusts, we admit
the formation of other trusts in a particular field
"but not as far reaching in influence throughout
the country. These two are the only distinctly
dominating interests in steam, transportation,
publie service, industrial, financial, insurance,
and banking. Some of the greatest Ttor^an en-
terprises in tne indu atrial world are the Steel and
•
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Skipping Trust, Electrical Supply Trust and
The Rubber Trust. Although not as conspicious
etc the Rockefeller Trust in the public utility
field, the Morgan interests dominate a series
of leader e n 1 1 rp r i c ;
.
In the railroad world, the Hotgun
interest exert by far the greatest g^Hi^ ror
put lie attention. For example — The Morgan
•_.roup of steam railway properties e;./braces over
forty- seven thousand miles of lines which is
more than twice the mileage of any one group.
Its railroad eapi talization is approximately
two and a half "billions of co liars. This immense
sum is about fifteen per cent of the railroad
capital in thi s country. It ie well to note that
practically all of the Morgan railroad holdings
is in the growing sections of the country. VAiere
the Morjan group have their immense holding (notably
the South and Northwest) their lines absolutely
dominate the section. such a domination is bound
to have its influence felt in the lar.;;e metropolitan
financial institutions, Life Insurance Companies
and Trust Companies.
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"THE BIG- T'tfO"; Kany people
have an erroneous impression concerning these
two ^reut combinations. They are not in any
sense co..ipeti tor a for power. They are not only
friendly but closely allied to one another,
ooine people aeclare that so closely are they
connected that they might really "be determined
as a single group known as the Rockefeller-Mor gan
Combi:i-.tion. Their dealings are especially noted
in Wall Street and here it is constantly hinted
that it is only a matter of time when these great
interests will join into a gigantic combine.
Smaller capitalists congregate around
these two great trusts. They become interrelated ow-
ing, ta mutual interests. For example: the
Pennsylvania Railroad interests are on the one h:.nd
allied with the Vanderb'ilts and on the other hand
vita the Rockefellers. Now, the Vanderbilts are
closely allied with the Morgan group. The Vander-
bilts and the Pennsylvania Railroad have recently
become the dominating factors in the Reading system,
which was formerly a Morgan. This Reading system
controls practically the whole of the anthracite
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cod region, v/hich has always been held "by
the Morgan interest.
C.::, Z 'T. " ;
r
_ "J: Ti e practice
of carriers favoring large "business industries
has an important part in supporting the power
of monopolies. The power v/hich a lar^e cor-
poration obtains, namely, that of local dis-
crimination, the ability to sell &oods eheaply
here and at hi ;>i iv.tes elsewhere is a dangerous
power
.
TRUST * o ULTIMATUM : The trust is
in a position to say to the purchaser of its
_oods: "You must buy your goods altogether of me;
if you buy ;;oods from anyone else we will do two
things; either one of which is sufficient to ruin
you. We will refuse to let you have any of our
^oods and will ^ive all of our goods to a rival,
and if this is not enough, we will instruct this
rival whom we are setting up against you, to sell
_oods so cheap that, no matter from whom you buy
them you cannot make a dollar. You will have to
lose many dollars on that part of your business." -1
The practice of many trusts ^ivin^ to
certain dealers the exclusive ri ht of handling their
1: Clark; The Problem of Monopoly, t>. 34.
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di scount
which their rivals cannot obtain, prove a to
"be an effective weapon of the great corporation.
Lar^e corporations carry on further eompetitive
warfare with their rivals by producing several
varieties of _,oods while their rivals make but
only a few.
ANALYSI 8 s As a final analysis
we find that the dominating influence in the
trusts are made up of an intricate network of
lar^e and small groups of capitalists, allied to
one another by tie* of more or leas importance,
dependent in one sense or another on the two
inammoth trust;; of Rockefeller ard Morgan. These
y not be termed '
heart into wnich the arteries' are visualized as
the lesser ^roup, yet all are connected. The
central source, therefore, influencejall that r;oe
on outside its individual sphere and retains its
control
.
LABOR AND TH7STS: A laborer i O i.
person who does work th .t requires st enjth rather

the* jkiii. Trusts depend on labor of such
individuals for jucceso. The laborer in re-
turn depends upon the trusts for fining the
necessities of life. Constantly v/e hear the
expression "a livin v/a..;e" . According to
public opinion "a livin g wage" should include
the necessities of life and an amount put aside
xUx ya%t bU'daliCU X ti. ly Uiy
Representatives of some of the
leading trusts have, at different times, ^iven
In most instances these executives have stated tha
because of increased production they have raided
its.
eapital in the trust h_s made such a move possible
Ajain testimony has been _;iven that many of the
executives of individual plants have been di smissc
wieir pra
bothered.
an

ROOSEVELT VS. THU3T3: Roose-
velt may well "be chosen as the president who
did more than all others to curl: the trusts,
even though there were sore findings during
Taft's admin stration. Roosevelt's attitude to-
ward the trusts was well worth knowing. He
assured Congress and the country that no "crude
or ill considered legislation" should interfere
with the "delicate mecnansim of aodern "business"
and yet it is significant that the first subject
he discussed in his message was "the great in-
dustrial combinations which are popularly known
as trusts." -1.
Roosevelt v/as not opposed to big
business as such. He realized that concentration
in industry was a natural and inevitable form of
development of our great resources. His plan
contained too much energy and initiative to con-
demn! those qualities possessed by the great
captains of industry who had built railroads across
this country and raised America to the foremost
position among the industrial nations of the world.
He declared that the great combinations wliich
Muzzey; History of the American People, p. 533

nxac t
'
; c al ly morjoooliz.ed the necf. ^ cities in-
privilege a from the .^ovcrniiient tiiey incurred
..
peo^
I n o the
fabulous profits "by char^iiv exorbitant prices
.
latures. The Government alone had the constitu-
11
He, t!
Department of Commerce and Industry which should
>al with tl
> >
marine
.
ITatural Law; The natural law
(Do right, avoid wrong) which engenders monopoly
is fundamental. Man has a private initiative an
i z e C u o c i c will
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TIO!TQPCLY VJ. JO 1 L'JI f.M 7
~
: U<*n-
ojoly and competition ooncide in industry and
flict but never wholly exter-
minati n~ one another. W3&cn •ompetltion is keen,
-j "but petiti
-
.
competition is exterminated monopoly reigns
.
dies.
t . I ,
tye:
buy or refuse to sell a commodity. -1.
1: Le Res^i^nol; Monopolies Past and Present^ >. 3.
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The patentee possesses the most
complete of all monopolies for he liae for a term
of ye^rs the exclusive ri^ht of manuf aeturi ng
and sailing Ms invention. The monopoly has no
real or effective value until society recognizes
the invention as one of economic value.
R~
*
yr
. ,TI IV} POWER
3
: When uonopoly
pos peaces the power to regulate production and to
restrict the supply of a commodity it has the ex-
clusive ri_ht of controlling price. The supply of
a £iven commodity and the number of persons who
desire to purchase it determines the price which
the ^/Uolic is willing to p&y. — 1.
LAW OP 3UPPLY AffD DEIVCT ; The trust
reduces the output of thei r goods and thus advance
the price. The price of a commodity could not he
increased unless the supply of the commodity was de-
creased. When the amount of oods to he offered to
public for sale is decreased sufficiently then the
public will buy the joods at a hi;;her price. -2
WAGE o 07 LAPQR : When competition is
present there are many manufacturers S«eking labor
1: Nolanj Combinations, Trusts and Monopolies, b . 40.
Z: Clerk* The problem of Monopoly, SB. 6, f

as well as there are many laborers seeking
employment. The employee receives wkat he is
approximately worth to Ms employer that is,
when his-presence adds to the output of the in-
dustry. In a regime of monopoly the tendency is
to reduce wa^es and raise prices. At present
there is a question as to whether the modern
trust, is a monopoly or not. -1.
:
r0:T0rOLY rO vTB ; Monopoly sets the
price of a commodity "by controllin;. the supply
and demand . The price of a commodity is made
possible "by a unity of action iunona the suppliers
and the demand*/? s. A monopoly eontrolli; eventy
to eighty per cent of the market supply or demand
of a certain article is in a position to determine
its price.
:
rOITOPQLY PRICE ; The monopolist tend
to set the price at a point which will bri ng him
the largest net profit. Monopoly price is price
set as a result of monopoly power. It is a ten-
dency for monopolists to operate in the field of
necessities for the consumer can not avoid pur-
chasin„ certain said articles. Vflien monopoly has
1: Glarkj The Problem of Monopoly^ ^. 7.
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the power to fix the price it is :_ore likely to he
a higher price -than if competition were present.
F^nTia TOWARD "Q"QI" T I TP ;3: The
common lav/ has for centuries looked askance at all
agreement b in restraint of trade and has done all
within its jurisdiction to "break up the growtte of
monopolies. People have always considered monopoly
as one of their greatest foes for it deprived them
of their liberties. -1.
TYPES OP i:QIT0P0Lir3 : The main type
3
of monopolies are:
1. Perso
£. Social.
3. ITatural.
4. "Corner"
The personal monopoly owes its origin
to a natural talent. A singer, painter, and orator
may he considered as a possessor of a personal
monopoly. A social monopoly arises from some special
arrangement of society. A social monopoly may he an
industrial monopoly or a legal monopoly. An industrial
monopoly may he due to centralized control of large
comhi nations of capital. A legal monopoly is obtained
1; Nolan: Comhi nations, Trusts, and Monopolies- p* 46
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"by law through which an individual or a group is
^iven the power to fix the price at which a
commo di ty sells. Hatural monopolies are due to
natural limitations affecting production and
consumption. A monopoly of a whe^t "corner"
constitutes a monopoly of a thine while control
over raiu.road transportation makes way for a
monopoly of material services and the monopoly
acquired over r te of wages "by a union is classed
as a monopoly of personal services.
Monopolies are "by nature generally
temporary. The s>,e s J. on of a who t "corner"
monopoly is in the acNSt cases temporary. A rail-
way monopoly is perhaps as permanent as any monopoly.
Economic history repeats itself as trusts and pools
are formed today and tomorrow they break down and
competition begins anew. Monopolies are in an un-
stable condition. However, they are tending toward
more st; ble and permanent establishments*. -1
Classifying monopolies according to
the nature of their control there , re: ( l) Selling;
monopolies and (;_) buying monopolies. When the
seller is in a position to be able to' fix the price
1. Le Ressigno^: Monopolies Past and Present, fc. 15.
•
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it is a selling monopoly. Some examples of the
^ellin_ monopoly are the Anthracite Coal Com-
bination; a city waterworks; and the Eell Telephone
System. When tlie purchasers combine and are able
to determine the price at whieh the goods must
sell on the market titan it is classified as a "buy-
ing monopoly.
PI A" 'OITD L'OrOPOLY : Tie owners of
the South Afriean Hiamond mines restrict the pro-
duction of their mines in order to fcrinr; about
the scarcity of diamonds on the market. The De Beers
Diamond Company is in a position to control the
output for it has a permanent "corner" which is based
upon ownership of the source of supply. The price
of diamond e is high owing to the fast that the supply
is naturally scarce and tliat certain companies have
control over the production. -1.
r ;
_LJ_.. 7
' r
\
~"~ r :~":r
,.
-/ r :
Corporations can "be prevented from influencing
either prices or wages. Laws could be passed and
enforced which would prevent the monopolistic tend-
ency of trust but at the same time not limiting its
power of production. Such a policy would take away
1: Le Ressignol: Monopolies Past and Present, jo. 14
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the powtr of driving eompetition out of the
field, yet it would o"btain for us a place in
the world market;-. The majority of our trust
laws are a repetition of the Old English laws
which had for their sole purpose the "breaking
up of c o-p artner ship s i . bu si ..u.,
TARIF?: One of the greatest
means or methods for promoting the industries
within this country has he en the tariff. Its
primary purpose is to protect the American
Manufacturers in competi ti on with the foreign
market. The distinguishing feature in American
politics has "been the controversy over the tariff
"by the major political parties. The Republican
Party has always advocated a protective tariff
"based upon the principle that the tariff should he
sufficient to compensate for the difference be-
tween labor at home and abroad. The Democratic Party
has always stood by the position that tariff should
be for revenue only. In many instances the tariff
has been more than sufficient to pay the difference
of cost of production at home and abroad. A de-
velopment of concentration in industry* has recited
which otherwise might not have occurred. Thi s has
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left the American manufacturer a great
opportunity to dispose of his _ooos in this
country protected "by the tariff and send Ms
surplus abroad where it would "be disposed of
at a lower rate. {As an example, The United
St,.tes Steel Corpor tion sold rails to the
Canadian Railroads cheaper than could he pur-
•hased in the United States. -1.
LAW 73. SREAT COKL-QRAH OF 3 ; A
trust having; a secure monopoly on its product
would charge a higher i\. te on its product. It
is true that a trust not having a secure monopoly
on its product will sell its goods at lower prite
than a number of its oompetitin_ concerns. The
trust having a secure monopoly will demand mono-
polistic prices v/hile the trust not having; a
monopoly will demand a price more favorable for the
purchaser.
:JBU3ES TO BE 3TQPPED ; T- t . e is a
need of preventing corporation from practising unfair
attacks on loeal producers. The outcome has been
tkat monopoly cuts out its rival and sets its own
price. The only means by which the local competitor
1: Van Hi se; Concentr tion ,.nd Control^ p. 22
%
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might survive would "be if the federal and state
laws made it unsafe for sueh practice to be
tarried on by monopoly. There is need of a lav/
demanding a regime, of uniform rates throughout
the country. There is a need of ^ivin^ the In-
terstate Commerce Commission more power so that
it may require uniform and intelligible account-
ing on the part of the railroad.
"Predatory acts" of the trust should
be prevented so as to ~ive its rivals a fair chance.
There appears to be every thine £ood in si gh t for
a country which aims to maintain for its citizens
the 60 entials of economic freedom; and there appears
that there is everything evil for a country which
curbs the economic freedom of its citizens. -1.
EFFECT OP EVIL3 ; The sompetitiTe
system has oven to be extremely beneficial to
the purchaser. Competition stimulates invention
and production; it insures the manufacturer of
rendeam^ the best co. a itie * . nc .ervicca; to the
ionsnimers at a reasonable and low price; it allows
for the payment of fair wa es to the employers;
and provides a reasonable profit for the competitors.
1: Clark: The Problem of Monopoly, J>. 41.
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The evils of the competitive system
arise v/hen a competitor "becomes discouraged and
"begins the practice of deception and fraud in
the manufacture and sale of his products. This
practice of deception and fraud fluctuation of
prices . -1
DUigpiNG ; Dumping is the practice
of foreign countries unloading their products at
a low price on the American markets, Theodore 0.
Yntems claims that there is no conceivable com-
bination of demand schedule and cost curve having
any relation to actual conditions which can render
profitable an increase in domestic price which was
not equally profitable before resort to dumping of
this sort. The charges made against dumping, namely,
that is raises domestic prices and that it lowers
the foreign prices are di sregarded.-2
The recognition of the necessity of
overcoming this dumping practice is based upon the
fact that dumping sells cheap irrespective of cost
for the sole purpose of cutting short the life of
the local competitors. The dumping price is dis-
criminating, yet, this does not mean it is below average.
1. Nolan; Combination, Trusts, and Monopolies, p. 20
.
2. The Journal of Political Economy; p. 686.
•
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The dumping of e.:;cej . sto ck which
ia already produced is partly responsible for
the maintenance of hi ,;her price 3 and the domestic
consumer. The dumping of manufactured articles
produced under decreasing marginal costs, tends
to lower the domestic price at which the maximum
profits are obtained. On the other hand, the
dumping of manufactured atticles produced under
Increasing marginal cost tends to raise the domestic
price at which the maximum profits are obtained.
TRtj ;To VS. UNIONS : With a few ex-
ceptions combinations have assumed no hostility
toward trade unions, but in most cases have dealt
with them in accordance with the wishes of their
managers. One exception is that of the American Steel
and Wire Company. Chairman Gates of this company has
stated that Mis organization lias not recognized trade
unions and will not recognize ttoem* It will deal with
employees as individuals and not as representatives of
the union. On the other hand the American Tin Plate
Company
J
national Steel Company, American Steel Hoop
Comp any , a d the Pe d e ral Ste el Co ..ip any have wi Hi n ;ly
and readily treated with the representatives of or-
_anized labor.
•
In the case of a contest between
-iJpC trade unions and one of the large •om'binati ona,
it is practically certain that if the labor
unions are not especially strong, the combinations
will win out. Tills is true for its management has
a number of different manufacturing plants and if
a strike is threatened in one, the work may be
tran sferred to Ocfcher e s :-, ab 1 i sh ten t s -
.
vA t he on
e
threatened would be closed. An example of such an
instance is that of the smelters' strike in
Colorado. The strikers were told tkat if they per-
sisted in their demands, the organization would
close the plant threatened and transfer the v/ork
to other plants.
On the other hand were all the
workmen to combine into one great union or federation
of unions in one line of industry, the situation
would be entirely changed. A strike in one establish-
ment would be followed in another and the consequence
would be that work v/ould cease in all places con-
trolled by the . i: timi. The effect upon the
employer would be very great as production was
stifled.
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS

AMERICAN FED^: ,..;TIQ1T ; Samuel
Gompers made the ao ertion, when President of
the American Feder ation of Labor, that it was "by
no means impossible for the trade unions to per-
fect their organization. By so doing they will
be in a position to resist any encroachments on
the part of the capitalists.
If an increase in wa,:es iu given to
the workingman, either one of two results follows,
the profits of the employer are lessened or the
price to the consumer is raised. Wa e s can be in-
creased when price s rioe jo the real content is with
the sonBurners* Under some ci r cum,•stance o tne workman
becomes a consumer and jive j back a part of what he
has received as an increase in wages, nevertheless, the
new distribution aids the laborer for there are
other consumers who make up the apparent deficit.
Competition being- kept down the employer
will take the lar. e share of the profit, Soon he
will be compelled to share with the wage earners if
they become organized and insist upon some monetary
recognition. The consumer will ultimately receive
a part under the influence of threatening competition.
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PUBLIC 3Y Y: In a contest
between coital and labor the empathy of the
public will almost always be on the side of lat>or.
Whatever benefit comes to either side from the
prepare of public opinion is likely to be on
the side of the laborer.
SMITH PLAH : Mr. E. P. S.-ith of
Bir .ingham, England, sug est- d ,. ^Irn to .•.void
strikes and other difficulties between employers
and their employees. He suggested that combinations
fckat control in rood part an entire industry be
made among; employees. A committee repre sc nti nr
each faction should fix relations between them as
regards wares and to a considerable extent prices.
There should be an understanding that v/a^es should
be fairly hi Jh ;,nd profits fairly lage. The "for-
gotten one" in this instance seems to be the con-
signer for interested parties determine what they
call fairness, yet in many cases wa-.es and price
v;ould seem unfair to him.
An attorney for one of the famous
trusts has s:id, that in his judgment the time is
fast approaching when governmental action v/ill
(•
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determine fair rates of profit for the capital-
ist. Over and above this amount 1 lor will "be
given a proportion and the consumer will gain
by the lowering of prices.
POLITICAL XF.T) SOCIAL LIsT,: What-
ever effect the trust may have upon prices, labor,
and profits, they have a more dangerous effect
upon our political and social life and upon the
morals of individuals. Vast suae of money are ex-
pended u^on the so-called lobbyist. His xjrime
duty is to watch out for any bill through t]ie
legislative chamber that aims to check his employer.
It is true politicians have accepted money for
aidin;; some particular trust yet is is for the
peoples* interest such abuses should be curtailed.
Education, as to the manner of your legislator's
work will do much toward correcting such an evil.
Not long ago, it was reported, that a bill was
passed in the legislative body of one of the larger
states by the j aymtnt of one hundred fifty thousand
collars to the leader of the party in power. Indeed,
some of the larger corporations put aside large
funds each year to be used for politic! favors,
ouch sums are charged to business expenses.
•
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JCimiC;" JU?:VR CO""- : .?.TY : Henry
0. Havemeyer, President of trie American Sug lt
Refining Company testified that his company had
contributed in some states to the Republican Party
and in others to the Democratic Party, the in-
tention being to stand in v.rell with the party
that dominated the individual state. They ex-
pected that the interests of their company would
he carefully considered.
ggLLIAM J . BRY/3T»s VI r : o i William
Jennings Bryan regarded trusts as dangerous
monopolies. He asserted that there could he no
such thing as a good trust. "To defend a private
monopoly," he said, "on the ;ro und that the
monopolist in charge is a benevolent and well
meanin- n, '.:ind to hi s employees and .;enerous
with his earnings, is like defending a despotism
on the ground that the despot is kind hearted and
sometimes use, is unlimited ^.ower i'or the benefit
of his subjects." -1
LA POLLETTE VS T rU |TS : Sen-,tor
Robert If. La Pollette, following 1905, declared
all eombinatioAs bad, the "gravest danger menacing
1. Bourne and Benton:' American History, p. 530.
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our free institutions -- It was as though the
jintry i cnased by a f tal plajue -- as
though it had gained a dan rous footing here
and there in the most populous districts where
Lj rarages were feeginnin.; to sreate dis-
tress and constern .tijn. It "..'wis a. case for
strict quarantine :.nd extermination." -1.
That political evils do t *i st is
beyond question. That the c s c
is the trust alone and the only remedy, the de-
struction of tiie trust is by no means vie rigmt
deduetion to draw, although a jr lany people
seem to l sp such as a mornal presumption.
The effect of industrial combination
upon oar social organization is of much greater
si wni fi canoe . Competition in industry develops
the power of individual self-direction. Gelf-
relianee, self-direeti on.and skill are the pri nary
f ctors of competition . As the weaker rivals
drop out, the standard of t±*t vhole industrial
structure is raised. Although seemingly cruel
for those tkat lose out, the competitive stru:<vle
has generally seemed best for society.
1: Bourne and Benton* American History^ p* 5S1
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GHQICE OP IITDlvr.'7ra?TT: Wken com-
binations among competitors arc first mode the
weaker one.; arc car d for. Instead of brine;
thrown into bankruptcy these smaller concerns
are carried into the combination (even at a low
price) and consequently not all is lost. In
cases where the independent manufacturer has lost
his fi~ht against the trust, the consumer ultimately
suffers, for the combination feels that its losses
are to "be recouped and the consumer is the one to
pay. Fierce competition leuds in moajf- casts to
general depression in the particular line involved.
Capital thus shifts from one source to another and
because of necessity; in the particular community,
under normal conditions, another industrial loess
is involved. A community, will, therefore, reap
benefit by a combination which stops competition
before it has re ched the so-called ruinous stage.
Unfair or illegal methods made the question farily
one of ethics or of criminal law.
".^TGT ; 'E" TT: Much criticism has been
centered upon individuals of power in large
co mbi nations because of t he i r so-called unf ai r

practice of granting opportunities of advancement
to their children and friends and thus di bearing;
the so -Ce lled favorite employee. Nevertheless,
it is t^TZfe, that in many cases if the^e raised
individuals prove incompetent they will be re-
placed "by capable employees v/ho have merited the
increase. If such is not the outcome the rivalry
of new capital will immediately maze itself felt.
Thus combination will fall before its small rivals
because of incompetent .manageaent
.
Many men are now trying to work in-
dependently v/ho are industrailly unfit to do 30 .
Their best efforts are produced only under
direction. Many " leader s of industry can point out
individual-, members v/ho are efficeint in their
particular line of work, yet, were they to attempt
to start themselves because of lack of busineso,
they would become rank failures. The result of
such endc vors can really be pointed out as a
distinct evil.
JUDICIARY ACT OP 178$ : . "The
Judiciary Act of 1739 did not establish a Penal
Code. That legislation is contained in the Crimes
Act of April' 50, 1890. That act contains no pro-
vision making inonopolies and criminal conspiracies
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in restraint of interstate trade and commerce
erime e. No Federal statute on that subject was
passed until Congress enacted the Sherman Act of
1890."
"The settled rule is, therefore, that
the sozBiflon lav/ in criminal cases can not he ad-
ministered in the Federal Courts, and their
jurisdiction does not extend to offense a unless
they are made crimes by an act of Congress." -1
3HTTRirAIT MTI- TRUST LAV/; At length
it became necessary to regulate the trusts hy
lav/s in order to protect independent producers
from unfair methods of competition and to guard
against the dangers of monopoly prices. State
after state had attempted to curb the power of the
trusts hut without effectiveness. This was due
partly to the difficulty of the problem, partly to
the fact that e - ch state could regulate only the
business which the corporation carried on within its
borders. 3o in 1890 Congress tried to solve the
problem by passing the Sherman Anti-Tru,,t Act. This
law made illegal all trusts or combinations which
aim to secure a monopoly as v/ell as any agreement in
1: Synder- Interstate Commerce Act and Federal
Anti-Trust Lav/s, p . 116.

--60-
rtstraint of interstate or foreign trt.de. It
applied to manufacturing and trading companies
u.j well w.j to railroad^; and it placed under
the ban every combination in restraint of trade
regardless of whether the merger of competing
concerns were harmful or advantageous to the
public. There was no commission, as in the
ca^e of railroads charged with the duty of carry-
ing out its provision. Suit after suit was
brought by different attorney generals to break
up illegal combinations. The usual result -. • .
that the to mbi nations were dissolved only to re-
appear in different form, pursuing about the same
methods.
The sections of the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act may be summarized as follows:
DIVISIONS : 1. Every contract, combination
in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states or
with foreign nations is hereby
declared illegal.
t
—61—
2. Monopolizing any part of
interstate and foreign trade
is a misdemenaor.
3. The above sections apply to
territories of the United
States and to tkt District of
Columbia.
4. Circuit courts shall have
jurisdiction; district attor-
neys must enforce the lav/ a by
instituting proceedings. The
use of injunctions is pcriaitted.
5. Wittneas may be summoned.
6. In addition to other penalties,
property in transit shall be
forfeited
.
7. Injured parties may sue for
damages nd receive triple da
.
e a
and costs.
0. The act applies to corporations
as well as individuals. -1
Statesmen hoped that the Sherman Act would curb the
trusts and rc store competition; but they were dia-
appointed. The forces o£ concentration were not
checked. At tilt opening of the twentieth century
nearly one third of all industries, excluding that of
1: Thorp: Economic Insti tutions M. 253-254
.
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agriculture, had been brought under the control
of the trust. Vigorous efforts were made "by the
Federal government to en fore e the Sherman Act.
Suit 3 v/ere brought against the oil trust, steel
trust, the agricultural implement trust, the to-
bacco trust and other such combinations. The net
result of this legal warfare proved small. The
barrenness of the anti -trust crusade was seen in
the ease of the oil trust.
SLKIITo LAW: The Elkins Act of
February 19, 1903 juniaked the receiver as well as
the giver of railroad rebates. "The St.tute en-
acted by the fifty- seventh Congress, commonly known
as tlae Elkins Law is merely an amendment to the In-
ter st; tc Commerce Act and is designed to afford a
more effective means of enforcing its provisions.
The act relates only to common carriers or those en-
gaged in the transportation of freight or passengers
for hire.
There is but little reason to hope for
radical improvement from a mere change in the method
of enforcing the provision of the old lav/, and as its
effects upon combinations engaged in other lines of
•
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trade raust necessarily "be indirectly and second-
arily, it is not likely to afford any material
relief to the general situation."
In May of the same year the Government
successfully prosecuted the "beef trusts for
violation of the law.
In two respects, however, the
legislation with regard to combination has been
made more liberal. It was felt that the fullest
co-operation amon^ merchants engaged in foreign
trade was desirable, if they were to compete in
foreign market o on a basis of equality with mer-
chant s from o tiier eo untri e s
.
yr ' ~, ? ; :. , t -v ; in 1914
Conjress came forward once more with measure de-
signed to lubricate the wheels of competition, de-
claring that unfair methods of competition were
unlawful. It established the Federal trade
commission and gave it power to prevent per ans,
partnerships, and corporations from using unfair
methods in trade. This excluded banks and rail-
ether?
roads for these were governed by^ agencies. This
commission hears the complaints of business men who
are suffering by reasons of the dishonest practise

of their rivals. Anions the complaints to which
it may jive heed are, falsi advertising, price
di scrinination, bribery of employers, mistradin.
of goods, rebates and all other such practices..
The Federal Trade Commission is composed of five
members whose term of office is seven years and who
are appointed by the president with the advice and
consent of the senate.
After complaints have been given to
the commission an investigation is immediately
started. If there is reason to believe the complaint
is juit, the offending party is ordereoto desist from
the unfair practice of which he is charged. If the
offenders obeys said order the matter is immediately
dropped. On the other hand, if the offender does
not obey, he is liable to be brought before the
Federal Coutt and if found guilty, to be punished
if he still continues said practice.
At present the powers of the Federal
Trade Commi ssion are .gr at.:;/ li: i ted, but its arms
may be strengthened at any time by Congress. Some
day it may become one of the most powerful agencies
of the Federal Government, The Inter st ate Commerce
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Commission at first could do little in the wsy
of sontrolling the railroads; but as the years
passed, Congress jave it more and more power,
until at last it was tested with the authority
to fix even the rates that carriers might charge
"both for passengers and freight.
There are a few individuals in the
United States who are of the opinion that the
Federal Tr^de Commission is not at all concerned
(
with the correctness of the facts presented to
the public and that it is concerned only with show-
ing, of? attempting to show that public utilities
are engaged in progagating their point of view on
an enormous scale. Ernest Greenwood stated that
the investigation of power utilities intrusted in
1927 to the Federal Trace Co. :i soion by order of
the Senate marked at last a desperate stand for
its life by the Trade Commission, Mr. Greenwood
seeks to discredit the work of the commission and
he claims that the public utilities of the United
States are accuse^ of propagating their point of
view, and of attempting to prove to the public
that they can operate their place at a lower rate
than the Federal Government can regulate them. -1.
1: The Independents June 30, 1928, p» 523.
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The primary function of the
Federal Trade Commi ssion i s to prevent un-
fair competition. The investigation of public
utilities propaganda is to ascertain whether
it is safe to permit the unrestricted and un-
regulated right of public service corporations.
It is for the protection of the public interest
that the municipal government regulates the
rules of business. -1.
CLAYTON ANT I
-
TRUST ACT: The law
creating the Federal Trade Commission was quickly
followed by the Clayton Trust Bill. This law is
a supplementary to the ohermen lav/ is aimed
directly at monopoly. The Clayton Act makes it un-
lawful for any concern to discriminate in price be-
tween different purchasers where the effect of
such discrimination is substantially to weaken
competition or to create a monopoly in any line of
trade; it further forbids any corporation from
acquiring the v/hole or any part of the stock of
another corporation where the effect of such ac-
quisition may substantially lessen competition be-
1: Independent: July 28, 19 28j p. 70-80.
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tween corporation whose stock it acquired and -
the corporation Making the acquisition; it for-
bids the interlocking of director, teg 1 , that is
to say, it forbids directors in certain classes
of corporations to act as directors in cor-
porations conducting the same line of business.
This lav/, however, declares that the labor of a
human being is not a commodity or an„ article of
commerce, and labor unions and farmers' organiza-
tions when they have no capital stock and are not
conducted for profit ire exempted from the op-
er tions of the laws. The lav/ declares th t the
anti -trust laws shall not be interpreted to forbid
or restrain union or union members "from lav/fully
carry in:; out the legitimate objects thereof, nor
shall such organizations be held -- therefore, to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade. -1 Therefore, it still remains an un-
answered question as to what the legitimate objects
of union are, or how they may he lav/fully sought*
This provision has not proven to be the protection
to unions as was first anticipated*
Vila.? ' C Vx ACT: Consequently the
V/ebb. Export Trade Act of 1913 provided that American
1: Federal Anti -Trust Laws with .Amendments) 6. 3ee. 6.
4
exporters might organize as sociati ons for con-
ducting export trade without thereby rendering
themselves liable for violation of the anil-truei
acts. The same principle was applied also in the
Co-operative Marketing Act passed in 1926 which
recognizes the rights of farmers, ranchers, and
growers to combine for the purpose of effecting
more efficient distribution of their products.
:.:tti THUiT PROVISIOT ::adio act
OF 1921 : Certain provisions were made in
19 27 pertaining to the radio communication. Tkfr *
licensing authority: v/as directed to refuse to grant
to any person, firm, or corporation a permit or
license who sought to gain control or monopolize
or attempt to monopolize radioneommuni cation. T<-e
expression "radio communni cation" .means any in-
telligence, message, signal, power, pictures, or
communication of any nature transferred by electrical
energy from one point to another without the aid of
any v/ire connecting the points from and at whi ch the
electrical energy is sent or received and any system
by means of which such transfer or energy is effected
OHIO oTATE LAW ; The federal govern-
ment has not been alone in waging v/ar upon the trusts
•
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In many c j. ...e 3 tue otw.te jo vernment lias attempted to
stem the tide of monopoly. For example, in Ohio a
trust is defined by the lav/ to be a combination of
capital, skill, or acts, by tv.o or more persons,
firms, partnership •, corporations, or association
of persons for any or all of the following purposes:
1. To ere,.' e or carry out restrictions
in trade or commerce*.
£. To limit or reduce the production of
a commodity
.
o. To increase or reduce the price of a
coiumo di ty
.
4. To prevent compe ti ti on in the manu-
facture or sale of a commodity.
5. To enter into an agreement not to seel
a commodity below a fixed value where
such an agreement precludes free and
unrestricted competition in the 3ale
by
.
Thus defined, the trust in Ohio is declared unlawful
against public policy ana void. A violation oj. the
anti - trust law is a conspiracy against trade, and a
person en.jajed in such a conspiracy is liable to fine
and imprisonment. Altogether more than thirty states
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have laws designed to control the trusts. Some
of the statutes concerning trusts we±e very
severe "but before they could be fully tested in
the courts, they were deprived of all power to
control the prowine trusts by the lav/ policy of
the three "charter gran tin;;" states, New Jersey
(until 1313), Delaware and Maine. These states
not only failed to pass anti-trust ±e;;-ulati ons,
but greatly relaxed their existing statutes.
Ninety five per cent of the trusts were accord-
Ly
corporation can be deprived of its charter only
for violation of the laws of the state in which
it is incorporated , the other states were practically
helple ss.
PJSGUlATIOr BY STATE S: " C o ngr e s
s
can legislate only as to interstate corner ce
.
The power conferred by the Constitution authorizes
it to regulate C0i.nn.erce among the sever. a1 st...tc >•
It has no power to legislate with regard to comerce
of
Power to forbid trusts, contracts, combintions, or
lines resides in the State Legislature." -1
Many of State Legislatives have
1: Synder^ Interstate Co.aierce Act and Federal
Anti -Trust Laws, jh. 115.
I
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passed laws prphiM tinj the practices whieh lead
to conspiracy of trade. Yet many states do not
provide punishment -or those who participate in
.
Congress is authorized through the
Constitution to puni sh three distinct classes of
crimes, namely
s
1. Counterfeiting.
fc. Piracies and i e _ o ni 6 s on the
.
3. Treason.
The power of the Federal Co art is curtailed for
they have no common lav/ jurisdiction over crimes.
DRASTIC PROVISIONS ; Several states
have a provision in their law which aims to take
away from the purchaser his duty of paying for
^•oods purchased from a trust. The anti- trust
legislation aids the purchaser in avoiding pay-
ment of goods "by pleading that the plaintiff was
a tru s t
.
Tl"-e Hissouri Anti-Trust Lav/ whieh
relieves the purchaser in suit by the trust is as
:
-
"Any purchaser of any article or
_
transacting oujiiiess contrary to any provision of
L
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be liable for the or payment of such
pay ,ient. M -1
AHE TEXAS:
to any suit fo:
STREITO-TH 01? LAY/'S OF ARE
The Anti -Trust laws of Arkansas
L.n& Texas w o to the very limit of severity in
need of laws of equal severity as tho se of
Arkansas and Texas to be adopted by other sta"
other . When i
condition doe
T~e breaking up of lar;re eorpora-
_
A come to an agreement with each
i corporation is broken up the nev
producing
]
There is need oi
servi
for their product a
if competition were
to oiler as
ient, If it wer<
1: 3. Inter
Anti-'.
ierce Act
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for competition to "be practical in the tru;
charge its ex-
oruit&nt prices.
EffUTCT 07 PR0535CUTIOIT : T e
Securities C> i new policy m the
or
The decisio:
five to fou:
ai jht strike next. ILr .
.ved was that no business, "big
-
-
T] e Nort Securi ti
ourt, which was
:ornbi: ;i on
I
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STATES VERSUS
TOBACCO CQ'TATY : In 1907 the Government brought
v/jii. en 1 % Y/as a
s
j>n ...e v.1, xnax uJij. o »onip any v/as main -*
Tobacco Company. On November 3, 1908, the Supre «
ito original parts. The court baaed it a di si si on
3upre..»e Court a.id finally on JX ; - y £9, 1911, a de~
I/O. Oil • -a.
UNIT5D oT ..,T^:> VS. BA?nP. iT>r;-"'T Ql?
D .--JTEUHY j C
TTTT
^ CT I CUT ; One . e ii si on of the Supreme
stiike in the factory of a hat uanufacturer of
Danb try, Connecticut. The union placed a boycott
on the s£:le of the company* s hats. The manufacturer
1: [Federal Anti-Trust Laws v/ith Amendments, fi. 99.
f
boycott and later a suit for damages.
In 190 J the Supreme Cour* ^.cci d<
tkat the laborers* "boycott had 5 inturfered with
the free flow of interstate courier ce in hats and,
members of
3
the urer recover* :e s fro u
deci
iprived it of one of
ized labor. The courts,
laborers s. It was a
ibi nation of laborers
SThTIVTO CI t . OOPPC^ ^?:t ;_ In 1911
the United States Supreme Court decided that the
Standard Oil Company was violating the Sherman Act,
relinquish its control c
_
nstituent eompanit
i» nil +-rn + "Rn +
it v/
of a)
e-
tt
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lations with the trust* Under such conditions
of ownership, anything like vigorous competition
• ]
....
ST . LQUI3 CI ^-OUT r,URT VJ. C TTT TT
,"T FT : Calai.ll Swift brought a suit
against Joseph F. Walsh for the payment of foods
purchased. The defendant claimed that the plantif
f
was a member of the "Plumbers' Trust" . thus con-
spiling in restraint of trade* Tx<.e jud^_e aecidea
that Cahill Swift could not receive payment of his
woods regardless of the fact that the price was
reasonable and the _oods sati sfact cry . To dcvte
there is no decision, made as to the true value of
this elastie provision in the Missouri anti- trust
ti on . -
1
CO'TOI LY Vo. Til?? sewer coi>
p^TY: The Illinois Anti -Trust Law approved June
£0, 1893, contained similar provisions to that con-
tained in the Missouri Anti-Trust Law. The Anti-Trua
1 I Snyder j Interstate Commerce Act and Federal
• Anti-Trust Laws
; p. 123
f
~ » 7 7 • •*
Law of Illinois was declared unt on atituti onal in
the case of Connolly Vs. The Sewer Pipe Company for-
it was made applicable to certain persons and
products and unapplicalle to others, namely
"agricultural products, or live sto ck , while in
the hands of the producer or raiser." -1
PRESENT D.-.Y PQ3ITI0:: HELP PY
IIOITOl o:il\) : People iiavt always regarded monopoly
as on their ^re^test foe, for it deprived the;, of
Cj.-i.tij. r jl j.
.
- » v j. •. . • ^jiiOjJO j.^ iewaro.s i*l.\g c e en so
prosecutions within the last twenty years, monopoli ea
and combinations continue. Governmental ownership
pro"
proved unsuccessful. Private ownership may he of
benefit to the community if brought under proper
control. If governmental regulation should "be
carried to its extreme, individual incentive would
cease, and the wheel a of progress would be arrested.
The present era is one of specialization and it is
almost impossible to curb the formation of com-
1: Snyder: Interstate Gomuier.ee Act and Federal
Anti-Trust Lav/Sy jp. 123.
f
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"binations. World trade demands that business
"be done on a lar^e scale. Business will flourish
and regulate itself alonw legitimate lines when
all are ^iA^en equal opportunities.
WWBOL^ £ i";.t:" : 'i^ir1 -;
:
The financial interests which hare obtained a
monopoly of our powers are the dominating, financial
powers of the world. The power banks and the power
politicians are accused of trying to obtain a
"inVJOT< A A !» + • > + O "V» T V\ >-> VC V> V. O yi r 4"i ^ Vn ny|/9 ,.11 J X.
j_ < U . . Ui t lit, >~> - -A U J \ cl oils .li. . IX Jil u>l 1U. — J- X ^ O
parts. -1 It is true that politicians have
accepted money for aiding some particular trust
and that some of the larger corporations put ai sde
a definite turn each year for political farprs,
cn ....
^ ^^ ;Zj„z~.. iz-
CE:uT3 : The public should not fear the consolidation
of. •ompeting industrial'. «oncerns where none of them
posoe any privilege. T-ae cj _.in stoi'e mas proved
to be beneficial for the publie, regardless of the
fact that competitors have been forced from the field
The system of self regulating competitive system
should rest upon the conscious regard for public in-
ter! st
.
1; Cu.ier.t Hi-tor,,-; April . p„ 4^.

INDIVIDUAL r.E3PQIT3I"T T ITY : Large
mercantile estaMigfements usually allow individual a
to care for their particular departments. Persons
holding such subordinate ^ouitions are granted in-
dependence. Res/.lts attained are noted. The^e
minor officials enjow full discretion as regards
management and thus may show their originality.
When a number of small railroads
are "brought into a lar^e system those individuals
who were formerly presidents now "become superin-
tendent s of the particular divisions. They re-
ceive approximately the same salary, hire the same
individuals and c^rry on in the same manner as
formerly. Even though they must report to the in-
dividuals of a higher order, they must realize that
in their former positions, they also had. to report
to the trustees of the prior ..,roup.
Very few men in responsible positions
at the present dt.y are without some checlc. Presi-
dents of railroads, professors in universities, and
superintendents of schools, each in turn are answer-
able to some hi her power, thus finding themselves
subject to control as well as direction.
Host employers are two well
satisfied with following ulon^ the same old-fashioned
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rut without at temp tins to show some originality
in their perf or..:;- nee of duties. Independent
thought if carried out after consultation has teen
a great aid to many individuals. The employee who
has shown himself capable will in almost all in-
stance s have free reign.
Much has "been said and written
about concerns who compel their employees to carry
oh for them in methods of a questionable character.
Nevertheless it is very seldom noted tkat any con-
cern will condone the wronj doing of its employees.
Very few combinations may be
found in the agricultural field. Occasionally it
is said, that wheat is cornered in some one market.
Combinations have been cornered the milk supply at
various intervals in some lar w e cities. Generally
speaking, food products of all kinds that come from
the farms or from the small producers are beyond the
reach of the so-called tru ;t . Dressed beef seems to
be an e ception to this rule in the opinion of many
observers.
I:T)I t TJ3UAL CHOICE ; EVery one,
therefore, who is able to do independent work still
retains t&at opportunity to find that which is most
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fitted for him. On the other hand it is equally
true that whenever the nature of an industry is
such tin t i t may "be controlled "by ai;y sombi nation,
peculuari ti es v,,il1 ^rise toward bringing about a
virtual monopoly. The Tru.t, therefore, afford
greater ^cope for individual power and management,
and unless brought under control they will not be able
to "orin^ positive injury to society. In other words,
the power of the Trusts to limit prices, and wa^es,
is still too jreat to be left in. their hands
without some governmental «heclc. Trusts should never
be in a position to assort, "We govern conditions."
• (
(
t
C0ffCLUSI 0r:_ Serious "blunder a have
"been iiia.de in the past both by the states and
federal government in regulating combinations.
The general trend has been to entirely suppress
any combination that "bordered on the rim of monopol
Law has endeavored to force competi tion to the
f orefror.t . In many in.jt :.;icc s the • dvantage of
combination in production has been overlooked.
Agreements have "been attached which if curbed
by public control would have established a fair
price to consumer. G-overnment owner ship has been
advocated on all sides as a solution to the
problems. After being trien without any
ppartnt success but failures private ownership
was restored. This may continue to be of
benefit to the public if regulated and brought
under control ,
It cannot be sai ... that the trust problem has
been solved at the present time. . in
spite of Anti-trust laws and anti-trust agencies,
combination still goes on; monopoly still thrives;
I - ^ - - U. 5 L> |JI U UXCul IB oOlxl uli.oJ J. V tU i J.'UI J C iu S3
of effort kas been given to solve this problem and
yet it is still dubious. The question now becomes
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one, wJa.et3a.tr or not monopoly v/ill be allowed to
gain unci coiiip e ti t i o n entirely T&niBJa* This,
indeed, is a question of deep concern and yet
it should not cause despair. Efficiency of
government and law can still fee relied upon.
!To matter how strong a combination may "be it
can be brought under control "by the federal
GrOvermneut, And the lav/ must always "be kept
bupr erne. Keep Government strong enou&ht so that
it may tipply remedies wlien needed. Indeed that
is tiie only solution if competition in business
is to live.
--ITT'ARY: T e record of the dovelop-
ment of the trust has been one of steady growth
in national strength and material wealth. Polit-
ical and social conditions of \today.. are distinct-
ly favorable to the production and acquisition of
wealth. Reliable estimates by scientific students
all tell the MB&e story-~of concentration of
wealth in the hands of the richest groups. About
the be^innin^ of the twentieth century J£c. G-eor^e
K . Holmes estimated from a study of the stt.ti sti c
s
•
#
that ninety-one per cent of the families of
the country own no wore than about twenty-nine
per cent of the wealth, and nine per cent of
tne families own ucout seventy per cent of the
wealth. It evident that we have moved a lone
distance from the democratic conditions of
comparative economic equality that existed
ive
fortunes of the United States have been made
possible "by the unrivaled opportunities for the
•sexploitation of natural resources, the appropria-
tion of the natural monopolies, and the
development of new line., of trade and manufactures.
Mcny of the natural resources have "been .monoplized
"by •u i cW) wno i^av© D6i» jjuc wea.Lt.uy vvitii. one ^rovnwn.
i
industrial world, tney n>.,ve exacted tribute of
y j
ij
aiscri iinatinjj favors fro raxlroads and other
natural monoplies through which their position
•<
<
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competitors. Uncler such cire-^Tr/.t rnee the growth
of their wealth lias not measured either the
efficient utilization of the resources of the contin-
ent nor the greatest social gain from their use.
Increased production has infrequently "been attended
"by increased inequality in distribution. Yet, it
must "be emphasised that the wonderful opportunities,
which the United States has in general opened to
ability and talent ha e spurred the virile and
capable to the fullest development of their native
powers, These persons have in most inatanees earned
their lcjr^e rewards and have conferred upon
society even greater benefits. There is a great
danger in a society wlii ch is purely democratic,
but economically plutocratic.
It is much easier to criticize than to surest
remedies, yet certain conclusions seem irresistible.
So far as this problem can be solved by means of
legislation, this should be use", to prevent monopoly.
Hot only this, but society should also assert its
right to all unearned values by ownership, by
special taxation, or other methods. Special privilege
must be prohibited and so far as possible the door
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inarily for information concerning the trusts and
their history as considered from as historical
vi evpoint • Valuable current information v/as tils
obtained from the publication^ of the department
of the Federal government. Among these may "be
mentioned t.ue Feaera-i. Aiitx""tru^t l-_ ws v/ith amend-
ments, bulletins from the Department oe'Coramerce
and annual reports of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. Particular phases of our economic
development obtained from Bogr&t's Economic
History of the United States. The American
Democracy furnished essential principles of our
government pertaininr to the Trust Problem.
The development of hi
important element in the
i vtiii mucii prominence in
aness as an
Oil
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Bryan's Tract Policy and Roosevelt's attitude
toward trust is very clearly written in Bourne
and Benton's American History. The Shermen Ant:
Trust Act c.nd the Federal Trade Commission,
i
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United States "by William Guittean.
Concentration and Control by Charles Van Hi se
should be read by all interested in the Trust
Problem for the distinguished method of treating
consolidation. The book of Richard T. Ely on
"I.Ionopolies and Trusts" contributed much toward
the economic viewpoint and a pracitcal side of
trust discussion. Jenk ! s "The Trust Problem" pre-
sents information gathered from personal investiga-
tion of large corporations. In the book of Willard L.
Thorp, "Ecoio\.ic Institutions" may be found an
analysis of those institutions that constitute our
economic system. "The History of the Standard Oil
Company" by Ida LI. Tarbell is very interesting for it
gives a full account of the greatest of all combinations
in American life. An account of the rise of combinations
to the end of gaining monopolistic features may be
easily understood after reading Edward Nolan's book
on Combi nations, Trusts and Monopolies. A comparison
of the ancient with the modern Trust is well recorded
in "Monopolies, Past and Present" by James Edward
Le Reasignol. John TToody points out a great many
truths showing a vast knowledge of his subject in
the book. "The Truth about The Trusts". The public

welfare against the trusts cites new problems that
are constantly brought to the attention of the
American people. H. C. Richie has viewed such
from the standpoint of thepublic. John Bates
Clark in his book entitled "The Problem of Monopoly"
stresses the rise and power of consolidation din
the latter part of nineteenth century. Richard T.
Ely* 3, "Problems of Today" dealt primarily with labor
and the trusts especially during the depression of
the country in times of pania. The United States
Daily, a newspaper published in Washington, D. C,
contained many items of interest during preparation
of the treatise.
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